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Teleosemantics without Etiology
Bence Nanay*y
The aim of teleosemantics is to give a scientiﬁcally respectable or ‘naturalistic’ theory of
mental content. This paper focuses on one of the key concepts of teleosemantics: bio-
logical function. It has been universally accepted in the teleosemantics literature that the
account of biological function one should use to ﬂesh out teleosemantics is that of etio-
logical function. My claim is that if we replace this concept of function with an alterna-
tive one and if we also restrict the scope of teleosemantics, we can arrive at an account
of biologizing mental content that is much less problematic than the previous attempts.
1. Introduction: Biologizing the Mind. Many (maybe not all) of our men-
tal states are about something; they refer to something. In other words, they
have content. The question then is this: how can we explain the relation be-
tween this mental state and what it is about?
This relation between a mental state, call it M, and what this mental state
is about, call it X, has some odd features that make it very different from the
explananda scientiﬁc theories tend to explain. First, we can have thoughts
about things that do not exist: in this case, this relation between M and X is
a relation between a mental state and something nonexistent. Second, the
relation between M and X is not a causal relation. Even if M is caused by Y,
not X, it may still be about X, not Y.
As a result, it may seem like a real challenge to give a scientiﬁcally re-
spectable or ‘naturalistic’ theory of mental content. But this is exactly what
the scientiﬁc research program of teleosemantics aims to do. It needs to be
emphasized that teleosemantics is not a theory, but rather a scientiﬁc re-
search program: a temporal sequence of a set of very different theories that
all share some core commitments. And in the case of teleosemantics, this
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core commitment is that we can use biology to explain mental content (Mil-
likan 1984; Dretske 1988; Papineau 1993; Neander 2006). More precisely,
we can use an account of biological function to arrive at a naturalistic, sci-
entiﬁcally respectable account of mental content. The general outline of how
this would work is the following:
(T) Representing X is having the biological function to indicate (or to carry
information about) X.
In other words, representation is function plus indication. As indication is a
harmless causal concept (roughly, indicating X means being reliably caused
by X) and function is understood as biological function, this way of ex-
plaining representation and mental content is a purely naturalistic one: it
really is a case of biologizing the mind.
In the debates surrounding the scope and merits of teleosemantics a lot
has been said about the concept of indication (or carrying information; see
esp. Godfrey-Smith 1991, 1996). The aim of this paper is to focus on the
other key concept of teleosemantics: biological function. It has been uni-
versally accepted in the teleosemantics literature that the account of biolog-
ical function one should use to ﬂesh out teleosemantics is that of etiologi-
cal function. My claim is that if we replace this concept of function with
an alternative one (which we have independent reasons to accept) and if
we also restrict the scope of teleosemantics, we can arrive at an account of
biologizing mental content that is much less problematic than the previous
attempts.
I said that teleosemantics is a scientiﬁc research program. But then it
must appear to be a degenerative and not a progressive one (Lakatos 1970,
1974). After the initial phase of a ﬂurry of papers in the 1980s and 1990s,
there is now, comparatively speaking, very little discussion about it. What
there is consists of various defenses of various versions of teleosemantics in
the face of objections. For Lakatos, a degenerative scientiﬁc research pro-
gram makes no (or hardly any) new predictions or new explanations. If a
degenerative research program contradicts new data, this does not falsify the
research program: there are many ways of modifying the research program
in such a way that the contradiction disappears. These modiﬁcations, how-
ever, involve adding extra, ad hoc assumptions to the ‘core’ of the research
program, which serves only one purpose: to explain away the contradiction.
These extra assumptions constitute the ‘protective belt’ of a degenerative
research program. The thicker the protective belt is, the more likely it is that
a research program is degenerative. The more new predictions and expla-
nations a research program provides, the more likely it is that it is pro-
gressive. Lakatos argues that it is often worth being loyal to a degenerative
research program for some time (as it may manage to recover), and my aim
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is to argue that we should be loyal to the scientiﬁc research program of teleo-
semantics and make it more progressive by updating the concept of biolog-
ical function it uses.
The plan of the paper is the following: I outline the concept of function
teleosemantics has been relying on (sec. 2) and argue that there are inde-
pendent problems with it and that we are better off replacing it with a more
plausible concept of function, the modal theory (sec. 3). I argue that if we
use this concept of function as the account of biological function in teleo-
semantics (and if we also restrict the explanatory scope of teleosemantics
to some important kinds of mental states), we can arrive at a more plausible
version of teleosemantics (secs. 4 and 5). Finally, I address a potential ob-
jection, the Problem of Stupid Actions (sec. 6).
2. Teleosemantics with Etiology. The concept of function teleosemantics
relies on is the etiological one. Very roughly, a trait T of an organism O has
function F if T’s doing F has contributed to the ﬁtness of O’s ancestors.
According to this account, what ﬁxes the function of a trait is its past, its
history—hence the label: the etiological account. The function of the human
heart is to pump blood because the fact that the heart pumped blood con-
tributed to the survival and reproduction of our ancestors (Millikan 1984;
Neander 1991a, 1991b; Grifﬁths 1993; Godfrey-Smith 1994; see also Wright
1973).
The etiological theory of function gives an elegant way of handling the
possibility of malfunctioning. An important feature of the concept of func-
tion that any theory needs to be able to account for is the possibility of mal-
functioning. An object may have a function but fail to perform this function.
If my heart skips a beat, it still has the function to pump blood, but at that
moment it fails to perform this function: it malfunctions. If we accept the
etiological theory of function, malfunctioning can be accounted for very
easily: it is perfectly possible that a trait of an organism has been selected for
doing F, but at the moment it does not perform (or maybe could not even
perform) F.
If we plug this etiological theory of function into the core claim of teleo-
semantics, what we get is the following:
(T-etiological) Mental state M of organism O represents X if and only if M’s
indicating X has contributed to the ﬁtness of O’s ancestors.
Or, to put it very simply, representing X means having been selected for in-
dicating X. This is what I take to be the dominant version of teleosemantics.
Many of the classic objections to teleosemantics are a direct consequence
of the etiological theory of function embedded within teleosemantics. The
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most famous of these is based on the swampman thought experiment. A
very direct consequence of the etiological deﬁnition of function is that what
ﬁxes the function of a trait is its past, not its present. Hence, if an organism
that is molecule for molecule identical to me (the swampman) were cre-
ated by chance, its organs would not have any functions, since it would lack
the evolutionary history that would ﬁx the function of these organs (Mil-
likan 1996; Neander 1996). And as, according to those versions of teleo-
semantics that use the etiological function, mental content is determined by
etiological function, this also means that this creature who is molecule for
molecule identical to me lacks any contentful thought.
Without going into the Byzantine details of the swampman literature
(Dennett 1996;Millikan 1996; Neander 1996; Papineau 1996, 2001; Braddon-
Mitchel and Jackson 2002), it can be pointed out that there are many ways
of answering this objection, some more plausible than others. Nonetheless,
it is worth noting that the swampman problem (if it is indeed a problem) is
a direct consequence of the etiological account of function that teleoseman-
tics tends to use. If we can use a different account of function in teleose-
mantics, this problem (again, if it is indeed a problem) would just go away.
My aim is to argue that we have independent reasons to reject the eti-
ological account of biological function. And if we do this, we need to re-
place the concept of function teleosemantics uses with a different one,
which would make teleosemantics more plausible.
3. A Problem for the Etiological Account of Biological Function—the
Individuation of Trait Types. I would like to raise another, more general
and perhaps more fundamental objection than the swampman thought ex-
periment that should persuade us to discard the etiological theory (see also
Nanay 2006, 2010, 2011b, 2012b).
The etiological deﬁnition of function presupposes that trait types can be
individuated in an unproblematic manner. The trait whose function is to be
deﬁned and the traits that have been selected for in the past must be of the
same type. But how can we individuate trait types? What makes hearts dif-
ferent from non-hearts?
The problem is that there is no coherent noncircular way of individuat-
ing trait types that is available to the etiological theory of function.
According to the etiological theory, the function of my token heart is de-
termined by some facts about what happened to some other traits that were
tokens of the same type as my heart: whether they were selected for, and if
so, what they were selected for. Thus, the function of my token heart is de-
termined by something that happened to some other tokens of the same type.
But then the etiological deﬁnition of function presupposes an indepen-
dent explanation for how trait types are individuated. The real problem is
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that no such independent explanation is available. The most plausible can-
didate for how to individuate trait types uses (at least partly) functional
criteria: a token object belongs to trait type T if and only if it has certain
functional properties—if it has the function to do F (the most important al-
ternatives are discussed in Nanay 2006, 2010). Those entities are hearts that
have the function of pumping blood. Those entities that do not have this
function are not hearts. As Karen Neander puts it, “Most biological catego-
ries are only deﬁnable in functional terms” (Neander 1991a, 180; see also
Beckner 1959, 112; Burge 1989, 312; Lewens 2004, 99). But the etiologi-
cal theory of function cannot help itself to this way of individuating trait
types when deﬁning function without running into circularity. As we have
seen, the etiological deﬁnition of function presupposes an account of trait
type individuation. Now, if we want to avoid circularity, we cannot use the
notion of function in order to explain trait type individuation. When we are
explaining function, the claim that x* (the trait whose function we are ex-
plaining) is a token of type X (the traits that have been selected in the past) is
part of the explanans. Hence, we cannot use the explanandum (function) to
explain part of the explanans (why x* is a token of type X; see also Grifﬁths
1993; Davies 2000, 2001; Neander 2002, 403; Neander and Rosenberg
2012).
4. AModal Theory of Biological Function. To sum up the argument so far,
the etiological theory should be disposed of, and we should look for some
other theory of function. The problem is that all alternatives to the etiologi-
cal theory of function deﬁne the function of a token trait in terms of some
properties of the trait type this trait is a token of. Hence, the alternatives of
the etiological theory—the propensity theory (Mills and Beatty 1979; Big-
elow and Pargetter 1987), the relational theory (Walsh 1996), as well as
Cummins’s ‘minimalist’ theory (Cummins 1975, 2002)—rely on an indepen-
dent account of individuating trait types (see Nanay 2010).
How can we then possibly give a plausible theory of function? The only
solution I can see is to deﬁne function without any reference to trait types.
If we could deﬁne function without appealing to trait type individuation,
then we could use this deﬁnition of function to individuate trait types with-
out running into circularity.
But then the function of a token trait must be determined entirely by the
properties of that very trait token and not by the properties of other tokens of
the trait type this token belongs to. How can we explain malfunctioning in
this framework? When a trait malfunctions, it is supposed to do (that is, it
has the function to do) F, but it does not do F. My heart malfunctions when
it does not pump blood (though it is supposed to / it has the function to do
so). If we deﬁne the function of a trait token in terms of the properties of
that trait token alone, then it is difﬁcult to see how the function can be
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different from what the trait token actually does. In other words, it is dif-
ﬁcult to see how such an account of function could explain malfunctioning.
In the light of these constraints, options are fairly limited with regard to
an unproblematic deﬁnition of biological function. In fact, I can see only
one such option, namely, to attribute modal force to claims about function.
To put it simply, trait x may not perform F, but if it were to perform F, this
would contribute to the ﬁtness of the organism with x. So the basic idea is
that the function of x is F if and only if it is true that if x is doing F, then this
would contribute to the ﬁtness of the organism with x. But some clariﬁca-
tions, comments, and elaborations are in order.
I deﬁned function with the help of a counterfactual. Any theory of coun-
terfactuals could be used to ﬁll in the details of this deﬁnition, but, for sim-
plicity, we can use Lewis’s theory (Lewis 1973): the function of organism
O’s trait x is to do F at time t if and only if some ‘relatively close’ possi-
ble worlds (different from the actual world) where x is doing F at t and this
contributes to O’s inclusive ﬁtness are closer to the actual world than any
of those possible worlds where x is doing F at t but this does not contrib-
ute to O’s inclusive ﬁtness (see Nanay 2010 for a detailed defense of this
deﬁnition).
While Lewis’s theory is useful in many ways—especially in clarifying
how function attribution depends on the explanatory context in terms of
what counts as a ‘relatively close’ possible world (see esp. Nanay 2012b)—
it is somewhat misleading in some other ways. If x is doing F in the ac-
tual world and this contributes to O’s inclusive ﬁtness, then this, being the
actual world, is closer than the closest possible world where x is doing F
but this does not contributes to O’s inclusive ﬁtness. Should we then con-
clude that whatever x is doing in the actual world in such a way that it con-
tributes to O’s inclusive ﬁtness automatically makes it x’s function? No, we
shouldn’t. This is why the deﬁnition put a restriction on the ‘relatively close’
possible, but not actual, worlds.What this means is that x may or may not be
doing F in the actual world, but when looking for the closest possible worlds
where its doing F contributes to O’s inclusive ﬁtness, we should ignore the
actual world.
If x is not doing (or even cannot do) F in the actual world, but in a
‘relatively close’ possible world it is doing F and its doing F contributes to
the organism’s inclusive ﬁtness, then we can still attribute function F to x.
This is exactly what happens if a trait is malfunctioning, that is, if it fails
to perform its function.
The concept of ‘relatively close’ possible world in the deﬁnition needs
some further elaboration. If wiggling one’s ears, for example, would kill all
approaching predators, this would contribute to one’s ﬁtness. But it is not
the function of my ears to kill all approaching animals because the possi-
ble world where this happens is not ‘relatively close’. What possible worlds
TELEOSEMANTICS WITHOUT ETIOLOGY 803
count as ‘relatively close’ depends on the explanatory context—this is what
makes function attributions depend on the explanatory context (see Nanay
½2012b for an elaboration on this point).
How can this proposal deal with the cases that are problematic for the
etiological approach? If the swampman’s heart pumped blood, then this
would contribute to the inclusive ﬁtness of the swampman (this follows
from the supposition that the swampman is molecule for molecule identical
to a human being); hence, the swampman’s heart has the function to pump
blood, in spite of the fact that he lacks history.
Finally, the modal theory of function is obviously not vulnerable to the
trait type individuation objection, because it does not use trait types when
deﬁning function. It deﬁnes the function of a token trait entirely in terms of
the properties of this token trait. To sum up, if we conceive of function the
way I suggested, some of the worrying consequences of the etiological view
disappear.
5. The Scope of Teleosemantics. To sum up, we have independent reasons
to use the modal theory of biological function and not the etiological one in
teleosemantics. We have seen that the core claim of teleosemantics is the
following:
(T) Representing X is having the biological function to indicate (or to carry
information about) X.
If we plug in the modal theory of function in this claim, what we get is the
following:
(T-modal) Mental state M of organism O represents X if and only if some
‘relatively close’ (non-actual) possible worlds where M carries information
about X and this contributes to O’s inclusive ﬁtness are closer to the actual
world than any of those possible worlds where M carries information about
X but this does not contribute to O’s inclusive ﬁtness.
Or, more simply, M represents X if M’s carrying information about X
would contribute to O’s inclusive fitness.
So far so good, but replacing the etiological notion of function with a
modal one is only half of the story. We also need to specify what ‘M’ is in
this deﬁnition: we need to specify the scope of teleosemantics—the set of
mental states that can be explained with the help of this explanatory scheme.
As we have seen, teleosemantics is a naturalistic account of mental con-
tent—it aims to explain mental content in a scientiﬁcally respectable, natu-
ralistic manner. But naturalistic accounts of mental content come in two
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varieties. As Godfrey-Smith says, “Immodest theories attempt to give a fully
general analysis of representation in naturalistic terms. Modest theories try
to divide and conquer. Modest theories only try to give a naturalistic account
of the most basic representational capacities. Then theories which are not
themselves naturalistic, as they presuppose representation in some form, can
be used to explain more complex types of representation” (Godfrey-Smith
1996, 176; see also Sterelny 1990). Many (maybe even most) versions of
teleosemantics are immodest theories: they are supposed to apply to all of
our mental states. The version I am outlining here is a modest, maybe a very
modest, theory. It only applies to one kind of mental state, one that I call
‘pragmatic representations’.
Besides the swampman cases, the other often-noted objection to teleo-
semantics is that we have many beliefs and thoughts about states of affairs
that clearly couldn’t have contributed to anyone’s ﬁtness, let alone our an-
cestors’. My belief about the differences between iPhones and BlackBerries
couldn’t have contributed to any of my ancestors’ ﬁtness. There are many
ways of dismissing this objection, but my strategy is to just disqualify men-
tal states like beliefs, thoughts, and desires (and other propositional atti-
tudes) from the scope of teleosemantics. I am not sure what function beliefs
or thoughts have, or whether they have the function to indicate anything. All
I claim is that the explanatory scheme of teleosemantics can be applied to
some (phylogenetically and ontogenetically) basic mental states—ones that
mediate directly between sensory input and motor output.
What mediates between sensory input and motor output? This is prob-
ably the most basic question one can ask about the mind. There is stimu-
lation on your retina, something happens in your skull, and then your hand
reaches out to grab the apple in front of you. What is it that happens in be-
tween? What representations make it possible for you to grab this apple?
My answer to these questions is that it is pragmatic representations that me-
diate between sensory input and motor output; pragmatic representations
make it possible for you to grab the apple.
Pragmatic representations are, at ﬁrst approximation, the representational
components of the immediate mental antecedents of action. The immedi-
ate mental antecedents of action are what make actions genuine actions.
They constitute the difference between actions and mere bodily movements.
They guide our ongoing bodily activities. And pragmatic representations are
the representational components of these immediate mental antecedents of
action.
They represent the world as being a certain way: they are about the world,
they refer to the world. In other words, they have representational content: they
represent objects as having certain properties. This, however, does not mean
that they must have a syntactically articulated propositional structure or that
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they really are sentences written in some mental language. Pragmatic rep-
resentations can be correct or incorrect. If they are correct, they guide our
bodily activities well. If they are incorrect, they guide us poorly.
What properties do pragmatic representations represent objects as hav-
ing? Suppose that you want to pick up a cup. In order to perform this ac-
tion, you need to represent the cup as having a certain spatial location; oth-
erwise, you would have no idea which direction to reach out toward. You
also need to represent it as having a certain size; otherwise, you could not
approach it with the appropriate grip size. And you also need to represent it
as having a certain weight; otherwise, you would not know what force you
need to exert when lifting it. I call these properties ‘action-properties’: action-
properties are the ones that need to be represented in order for the agent to
perform the action. Pragmatic representations attribute action-properties:
they represent objects in an action-oriented manner (Nanay 2011a, 2012a,
2013a, 2013b, 2014). And they typically attribute these action-properties
unconsciously; for similar mental states with different labels, see Myles
Brand’s ‘immediate intentions’ (Brand 1984), Kent Bach’s ‘executive repre-
sentations’ (Bach 1978), John Searle’s ‘intentions-in-action’ (Searle 1983),
Ruth Millikan’s ‘goal state representation’ (Millikan 2004, chap. 16), Marc
Jeannerod’s ‘representation of goals for actions’ or ‘visuomotor representa-
tions’ (Jeannerod 1994, sec. 5; Jeannerod 1997; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003,
202–4), Andy Clark’s and Pete Mandik’s ‘action-oriented representations’
(Clark 1997; Mandik 2005; Nanay 2012a), and Stephen Butterﬁll and Cor-
rado Sinigaglia’s ‘motor representations’ (Butterﬁll and Sinigaglia, forth-
coming; for more see also Hommel et al. 2001; Norman 2002; Grush 2004;
Pacherie 2011).
These mental states are both phylogenetically and ontogenetically quite
basic. Animals and small children are capable of performing goal-directed
actions, such as running away from predators or chasing prey. But if they
are, they must be able to have pragmatic representations. Hence, even or-
ganisms that may be incapable of entertaining complex thoughts and beliefs
must be able to have pragmatic representations.
As pragmatic representations are directly relevant for the successful per-
formance of actions, there is obvious selection pressure on them. This makes
them a good candidate for being the explananda of teleosemantics. So the
explanatory scheme would be the following: pragmatic representations rep-
resent action-properties if and only if they have the function to carry infor-
mation about these action-properties. Or, to plug in the modal account of
function:
(T-modal, modest) Pragmatic representation M of organism O represents
action-property X if and only if some ‘relatively close’ (non-actual) possible
worlds where M carries information about X and this contributes to O’s in-
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clusive ﬁtness are closer to the actual world than any of those possible worlds
where M carries information about X but this does not contribute to O’s in-
clusive ﬁtness.
Or, to put it very simply, a pragmatic representation represents action-
properties if and only if its carrying information about these action-properties
would contribute to the organism’s fitness.
The version of teleosemantics that this explanatory scheme gives rise to
is an extremely modest theory of mental content—it only purports to ex-
plain the content of pragmatic representations. And this modesty is what
helps this explanatory scheme to address yet another widely advertised ob-
jection to previous versions of teleosemantics: the problem of functional
indeterminacy.
Any given mental state carries information about a number of different
entities. But the content of any given mental state is supposed to be de-
terminate. According to the general explanatory scheme of teleosemantics,
it is the concept of function that gets rid of this indeterminacy. The problem
is that it is not at all clear how the concept of function can do so. To use
the eternal example in this literature, when the frog snaps at a ﬂy, what is
the content of its mental state? Is it a ﬂy? Frog food? A parcel of chemicals
nutritious for frogs? Something small, dark, and moving? Small dark and
moving food? All of the above? All these options have been suggested in
the literature (for an exasperated overview see Neander 2006, 168).
One way of putting this problem is to ask whether it is the function of the
representation-producing system or that of the representation-consuming
system that ﬁxes content. And here focusing on pragmatic representations
has a major advantage: pragmatic representations are produced to be con-
sumed in one and only one way—to help us perform the action successfully.
In other words, the pragmatic representation-producing and representation-
consuming systems both have the function to indicate action-properties.
6. The Problem of Stupid Actions. Finally, I need to address an important
potential objection to this version of teleosemantics (which is also a potential
objection to any version of teleosemantics). Successful actions are not al-
ways ﬁtness enhancing. They do not always contribute to one’s ﬁtness. Take
the action of drinking a cup of poison. This action, if successful, does not
contribute to one’s ﬁtness. But then even if the correctness of a mental rep-
resentation increases the chances of the successful performance of an action,
this does not guarantee that it thereby also increases the organism’s ﬁtness. I
call this problem the Problem of Stupid Actions.
Why is the Problem of Stupid Actions a problem for my version of teleo-
semantics? Because while pragmatic representations are, by deﬁnition, men-
tal states the correctness of which increases the probability of the success-
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ful performance of actions based on them, they may not increase the ﬁtness
of the organism. And if this is so, then it is just not true that a pragmatic
representation’s carrying information about the action-properties it repre-
sents would contribute to the organism’s ﬁtness. But as it follows from the
deﬁnition that a pragmatic representation’s carrying information about the
action-properties it represents would contribute to the organism’s ﬁtness,
this means that the version of teleosemantics I outlined is not tenable.
Here is an example: Suppose that you throw a hand grenade at me and I
catch it. My pragmatic representation makes it possible for me to catch this
hand grenade: I attribute the correct spatial location property to the gre-
nade that allows me to reach out in the right direction. I attribute the cor-
rect size property that allows me to form the appropriate grip size. And so
on. The correctness of my pragmatic representation is responsible for the
success of my action of catching the hand grenade. But, as a result of this
successful action, I die. Carrying information about the relevant action-
properties does not increase my ﬁtness. Nonetheless, my pragmatic repre-
sentation represents these relevant action-properties correctly. We seem to
have found a counterexample to the explanatory scheme of teleosemantics
I outlined above.
Or, have we? It would be difﬁcult to deny that carrying information about
the relevant action-properties does not increase my ﬁtness in the actual
world. But what ﬁxes function and, as a result, mental content is not the ac-
tual world, but the nearby possible worlds. And carrying information about
the relevant action-properties does increase my ﬁtness in some nearby pos-
sible worlds.
In order to duck and avoid being blown up by the hand grenade would
also require a pragmatic representation that carries information about the
relevant action-properties. The problem with the actual world is that my
pragmatic representation is connected to the wrong beliefs/desires. In other
words, my pragmatic representation is malfunctioning in the actual world.
But it does have the function, ﬁxed by the nearby possible worlds, to carry
information about the action-properties of the hand grenade. There is no
contradiction here. The Problem of Stupid Actions is not a problem for my
version of teleosemantics.
7. Conclusion. Finally, it is important to emphasize again the modesty of
my proposal. Even if the explanatory scheme I put forward in this paper
does work, we still have a lot to do in order to explain the content of our
mental states in general. If the argument I presented here is correct, then the
content of pragmatic representations can be explained in terms of teleo-
semantics. Whether and in what way the content of all other mental states
can be explained is a different question; nothing I have said here helps us
with that task. But if we do manage to explain the content of pragmatic rep-
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resentationswith the help of the explanatory scheme of teleosemantics, then
at least we have a good starting point.
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